
**THE PURSUIT OF EFFECTIVE EXTERNAL SUPPORT
AND PERSISTING EXTERNAL INFLUENCE—DIRECT, INDIRECT, AND NEGOTIATED**

Joel Samoff
Stanford University

*Prepared for presentation at the Nuffic Expert Meeting
A Changing Landscape:
Making support to tertiary education and research in developing countries more effective
The Hague, The Netherlands, 23–25 May 2005*

6 May 2005

The Pursuit of Effective External Support and Persisting External Influence—Direct, Indirect, and Negotiated

Joel Samoff

FOREIGN AID: A PROBLEMATIC RELATIONSHIP

When does foreign assistance actually help? Or rather, who benefits from foreign aid?

Regularly individuals, organizations, and countries make the case for increased external support to education in poor countries. Major conferences take that as their starting premise or reach that as their principal conclusion. That is especially apparent for higher education in Africa, whose deterioration in the late 20th century was dramatic and obvious. While everyone agrees on the importance of high quality higher education for development goals, however defined, few African countries can meet its cost. Competent and stable academic staff, high cost equipment in engineering, medicine, and the sciences, up-to-date information technology, well functioning and well stocked libraries and laboratories, even ordinary classrooms and chalkboards overwhelm national budgets and are often underfunded or unfunded as resources are allocated to other activities deemed of higher priority. Observers, both African and foreign, regularly report that higher education in Africa simply must have more external support. There is no alternative, others confirm.

At the same time, the critiques of external support are widespread and increasingly sharp. Among the sharpest critics are its providers. Monitors of many sorts note its problems. The global reports on efforts to achieve education for all have shown clearly that the current and projected volume of foreign aid cannot sustain internationally agreed objectives.¹ Systematic evaluations, at both larger and smaller scale, have gone beyond the volume of aid to highlight problems in the aid process.² Development cooperation is constrained by inequalities of wealth and power. The promise of partnership is undermined by the persisting assertion of national interests and external expertise. New technologies expected to reduce gaps in practice increase and entrench them.

Most striking in the monitoring and evaluation is that many of the major impediments to using external support to achieve global, national, and local education objectives are common across diverse settings. They put at risk efforts to expand access, reduce inequalities, and improve quality. Of course there are important variations. Still, the problems identified are not occasional or ephemeral and are not unique to particular programmes or countries. Many have been noted and studied over decades. Yet they persist.

1. The annual Education for All Global Monitoring Reports provide extensive detail, especially *Education for All: Is the World on Track? Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2002* (Paris: UNESCO, 2002).

2. Several recent evaluations, differing in scope, focus, and style but complementary in their attention to problems in the aid relationship were presented at a colloquium organized by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague in March 2004: *From Evaluation to Policy and Practice: Aid and Education. Local Solutions to Global Challenges: Toward Effective Partnership in Basic Education. Final Report* (The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Consultative Group of Evaluation Departments, 2003). Malcolm Mercer, Paola Gosparini, Paola Melchiori, François Orivel, Matteo Sirtori, and Tuija Steinback, *Evaluation of EC Support to the Education Sector in ACP Countries. Synthesis Report* (Brussels: Development Researchers' Network and FTP International, 2002). Richard Sack, Michael Cross, and Jeanne Moulton, *Evaluation of Finnish Education Sector Development Cooperation* (Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2004).

This combination—the call for increased external support, the unending efforts to modify and refine the objectives and forms of foreign assistance, the imaginative ideas and good will of many people involved in providing and receiving foreign aid, and the regular observations that important aid objectives have not been met and seem unlikely to be met—confirms that it is the aid process itself that is fundamentally flawed.

What is to be done?

To contribute to this discussion of strategies for making support to higher education and research in developing countries more effective, I shall comment on several dimensions of the aid process. The aspirations here are modest: an initial attempt to explore common patterns that are often obscured by the specificities of particular projects, or support programmes, or national education policies. My starting premise is that *the effectiveness of external support is in significant part a function of the aid process and the aid relationship*. Starting there is not to ignore the intentions, or energies, or good will of those involved in providing and receiving external support or to devalue the efforts of some funding and technical assistance agencies to do things differently. Those efforts matter. My starting premise functions to insist that we explore and assess those efforts in an understanding of aid as a structured relationship that often stymies even those who are the most creative, the most tireless, and the best willed. It functions as well to insist that we address the ways in which particular values, assumptions, ideas, interests, and priorities are so deeply embedded that participants and observers fail to notice them or understand their significance and consequences.

To reiterate, the concern here with broad trends and commonalities is not to ignore the differences among agencies and countries (which several authors have studied systematically and critically) or to devalue innovative departures or radical alternatives. Indeed, the point of this paper is to encourage them. At the same time, it is essential to recognize that what is problematic is the *structure* of the aid relationship, not the misunderstandings or insensitivities or arrogance of a particular agency or individual.

To pursue that exploration of common patterns, I begin with attention to several important dimensions of the aid relationship, including the terminology used to characterize it. To elaborate how the most important pathways of influence may be the least obvious, I report on a recent analysis of World Bank higher education policies and their consequences for Africa. To keep the discussion grounded, my frame of reference is Africa.

HIGHER EDUCATION IS A GLOBAL UNDERTAKING

While higher education institutions are located in particular countries and governed by the policies and laws of those countries, throughout its history higher education has depended on the international exchange of scholars and scholarship. Globalization is the current buzz word. But the cross-border exchanges of ideas, science, technology, and those who develop them long preceded the current era.

Modern higher education in Africa (I leave for another discussion higher learning in the precolonial era) has a distinctly dependent history.³ Most of Africa's oldest universities began as branch or remote campuses of European institutions. Even after the end of colonial rule, the

3. For the development of this theme see Joel Samoff and Bidemi Carrol, "The Promise of Partnership and Continuities of Dependence: External Support to Higher Education in Africa," *African Studies Review* 47,1(April 2004):67-199, and the references cited.

metropolitan institutions continued to provide faculty, curriculum, and external examiners and to be the arbiter of quality. For most, that dependence has become much less direct, though it has certainly not disappeared. Consider, for example, who specifies the high status academic journals where publication by African researchers can confer individual and institutional recognition, respect, and remuneration. Consider, too, the overseas programmes of respected (and less well known) universities that bring to Africa learning objectives, curriculum, and examinations developed and packaged abroad.

To note that dependence and to see it as problematic is not to argue for an African isolationism in higher education. That would surely be short-sighted. What is essential, it seems to me, is to distinguish between exchange and control. Important too is the recognition that external control is inimical to developing the sort of higher education that can play a critical role in addressing persisting poverty and dependence in Africa.

To explore how to maintain and expand international exchange, collaboration, and cooperation in higher education without extending dependence requires rejecting the common dichotomy of national=good/foreign=bad. What is problematic are settings where education communities are unable to specify the fundamental objectives, ethos, and working style of their institutions and thus where higher education institutions cannot play a generative role in national development, however that is locally specified. Analytically, what is most challenging is the internalization of external influence, where the articulators and protectors of foreign influence are national citizens genuinely committed to improving things in their own country.

TERMINOLOGY

Words matter.⁴ The language we use structures how we think about things. An event or relationship may have multiple appearances depending on how it is labeled. The cliché is the assertion that a glass can be described as half full or half empty. The point of the assertion is that what really matters is the perspective of the observer. The consequence of the assertion is to distract our attention from the relationship between the fullness of the glass and the need for the liquid. To shift to the development arena, it may be fundamentally misleading to consider a half-completed project good progress toward its ultimate objectives. Partial completion may have displaced people without offering benefits, or felled trees without providing alternative firewood, or left the school with walls and no roof. If the local community is injured or alienated, the partial completion may itself be an obstacle to achieving the specified objectives. In this example, partial completion may be an indication of good progress (the glass is half full) or a failed project (the glass is half empty). That is not a matter of the perspective of the observer but of the project and its setting.

Over many years the development business has spawned a standardized authoritative terminology. Within that terminology are embedded particular conceptions, orientations, prejudices, and policy preferences. Many of the commonly employed terms treat as part of the environment—what is "given" and therefore does not require explicit justification and is not subjected to critical attention—important issues that ought to be the focus of policy discussion. All too often, that terminology obscures important issues and roles. Not infrequently, it misdirects

4. I summarize here themes I have developed in several publications. Among them, see Joel Samoff, "Chaos and Certainty in Development," *World Development* 24,4(April 1996):611-633, and "From Funding Projects to Supporting Sectors? Observations on the Aid Relationship in Burkina Faso," *International Journal of Educational Development* 24,4(July 2004):397-427.

the search for understanding. Indeed, one of the most powerful mechanisms of influence and control is to be able to specify the words used to describe particular events or relationships.

One example must suffice. How to label school attrition, that is, learners who begin but do not complete a course of study? The common terminology is “drop out,” which then leads to “wastage” (misallocated public resources). Understood in this way, wastage is often identified as one of the most serious problems in African education. Surely no one finds high drop out rates desirable. Resources allocated to students who do not remain in school might well be better used elsewhere. “Wastage,” however, lumps together disaffected learners who drop out of school, pupils whose poor examination scores lead to their exclusion, and students who score well but who are precluded from continuing by the lack of available places. In many countries high attrition rates are a normal feature of the education system, not unexpected, or abnormal, or even avoidable waste. Indeed, many education systems are designed to assure progressively narrower selection.

Note how the words direct attention. Concern with wastage focuses on individual motivation and achievement and on the quality of instruction. Concern with attrition points to the basic assumptions and organization of the education system. Concern with push out or eviction requires attention to which students are not permitted to proceed. Are females, or students from a particular region or religion or socioeconomic stratum more likely to be excluded?

Partnership

Prominent in the contemporary terminology is *partnership*. Partnership for international development cooperation is the currently preferred characterization of foreign assistance. No longer the rich uncle helping the indigent and perhaps profligate nephew, but partners working side by side to enable the poor to become more self-sufficient. There have been important conceptual shifts in how aid is described: from charity to technical assistance to cooperation to partnership.

The practice, however, has changed less than the terminology.⁵ “Partnership” is used simply to label whatever is the current pattern of interaction between aid provider and aid recipient.

Why does that matter? Why not accept whatever terms people prefer to employ? Recall that our concern here is the aid relationship, and particularly the ways in which that relationship renders external support ineffective. Applying “partnership” like a whitewash on every weathered and crumbling fence makes it difficult to see whether or not the fence is serving its purpose and if not, what must be done.

Support to higher education in Africa is particularly plagued by this confusion. Many support programmes—public and private, large and small, government-to-government, institution-to-institution—are labeled partnerships. Most could be more accurately described as technical assistance. A foreign institution or organization or government provides specific support, whether equipment, or staff, or funds for particular activities, to an African university. Initiative, decision making, monitoring, and control over funding remain largely or entirely overseas. While there may be extensive consultation, power and authority are generally not shared. Arrangements of this sort may prove to be very useful, but terming them “partnerships”

5. Joel Samoff, “From Funding Projects to Supporting Sectors? Observations on the Aid Relationship in Burkina Faso,” *International Journal of Educational Development* 24,4(July 2004):397-427.

obscures the structured roles that perpetuate inequalities and that may keep them from achieving their stated objectives.

Some higher education support programmes go beyond technical assistance (A helping B) to development cooperation (A working with B). Foreign and African institutions undertake joint research projects. Teacher educators in Africa may be paired with foreign counterparts to learn new approaches and improve their skills. Foreign universities may admit and support students from their African partner institution. There are many more modalities. But here too, the foreign institution generally retains ultimate decision making authority and control over funding. Once again, the terminology, “partnership,” tends to obscure the structured roles and responsibilities that—notwithstanding the intent of those involved—perpetuate dependence.

The rationales for technical assistance and development cooperation of this sort are clear and regularly reiterated. African higher education institutions are weak and need support. Only later, after they have gained strength, it is argued, can the European institution expect to benefit.

While those rationales are clear, they preclude partnership. They may also impede development.

A strong notion of partnership requires that both partners see clear benefits in the relationship. Put sharply, if the European partner cannot see direct benefits in the relationship, then there may be assistance or support but not partnership.

As I have noted, technical assistance and development support may be very useful. But they can also be debilitating. Terming them partnerships obscures the relationships that makes them debilitating.

The claim that European institutions have little or nothing to gain from their weaker African counterparts is at best puzzling and frustrating and at worst short-sighted, arrogant, and likely to maintain dependence. Surely it is possible to envision relationships between foreign and African universities that provide significant and tangible benefits to the foreign institutions. They may, for example, learn from research conducted in Africa—perhaps not high energy physics but research in marine biology, or plate tectonics, or archeology, or linguistics, or public health, or democracy. African educators have pioneered innovative approaches to science education, adult literacy, and collecting oral histories. These lists could be much longer.

Until foreign institutions recognize they have something to learn from their African counterparts there cannot be effective partnership. Until there is effective partnership, inequalities of power, authority, and wealth will not be managed for mutual benefit but instead will perpetuate relations of dependence. Until there is effective partnership, external support cannot be effective in assisting African institutions to set their own agendas and priorities, to play a generative and constitutive role in the international higher education community, and to contribute significantly to national development.

Ownership

“Country-led development” is another of the must-use terms in the development discourse. The government must specify development (for our discussion, education) policy, which then must inform and shape how foreign aid is used. The cliché here is a motoring metaphor: Africa must be in the driver’s seat. The common rejoinder in Africa is to reject the role of chauffeur.

Notice how the African rejoinder captures a powerful critique. In Europe, the person in the driver's seat decides where to go. In Africa, the person in the driver's seat may well be in the employ of the passenger, who makes the major decisions. While the passenger specifies the final destination, the choice of route, and thus ostensibly where and how to go, may be left to the driver.

There are two related issues here. First, does the development agenda reflect national and local needs, interests, and preferences? Second, do national and local authorities and others feel sufficient responsibility for that agenda to commit themselves to achieving it? The understanding of the importance of "ownership" grew out of the recognition that projects, programs, and the development agenda more broadly that were imported and perhaps imposed by outsiders withered when the external support declined and could not be sustained.

Formally, all funding and technical assistance agencies regularly reiterate their commitment to that strong national role and their willingness, indeed obligation, to situate their own activities within a nationally designed and managed framework. Formally, requests for aid come from African institutions and countries. At the same time, many agencies maintain objectives and procedures that reflect their own understandings, goals, priorities, and formal responsibilities. As well, external support continues to carry conditions. To receive funding, African countries must agree to make specified changes and set specified targets, both for the management of the national economy and within the education sector. External constraints and influences can thus be direct and indirect, obvious and very subtle. Formal conditions for foreign aid are the clearest but not the only forms. That should no longer surprise us. External funding agencies are structurally obliged to impose conditions and assert influence. Their training and socialization encourage agency officials to assume, and to expect others to assume, that they are likely to know what is best, what works and what does not, and what ought to be done.

Country led development requires a strong and assertive national leadership that is willing on occasion to terminate aid negotiations or even a funded programme rather than acquiesce in external direction. Occasionally that does occur, as does formal agreement on externally set expectations combined with quiet non-compliance. More common in the aid relationship is the acceptance and internalization of external direction and priorities. Risking the loss of funding deemed essential carries a very high political price for government and education officials.

Thus, the uncritical use of "country led development" and "national ownership" obscures the persistence of the same structured relationships that have characterized the aid relationship over many years. Yes, policies and programmes are officially set within Africa. Often that means that received wisdom appears in local idioms printed locally.

Certainly it is possible to envision a meeting of minds. African authorities may well come to find useful and to own ideas they imported, borrowed, and adapted. Learning, both individual and institutional, involves exchanging ideas and understandings. That itself is not problematic. But applying "ownership" to every plan or policy or document signed by an African official obscures what may on closer scrutiny may prove to be a dramatic lack of ownership.

The claim of ownership can best be tested in circumstances where external funders and national and/or higher education authorities can be expected to have different objectives, or priorities, or institutional arrangements. Confirming the claim requires evidence that external agencies have modified their expectations and conditions, have openly and genuinely negotiated

their efforts to pursue their own national interests, and have agreed to support programmes whose direction, organization, and outcomes they cannot control.

Assessing national ownership also requires critical attention to the common equation that “Africa” = “government.” Recall that ownership is deemed important because initiatives and reforms that are not locally owned are difficult to implement and impossible to sustain. What matters then is not just the support of national authorities but also the deep involvement of education communities, both individuals and organizations. From this perspective, government’s responsibility is not simply to speak on behalf of the country but also to ensure that diverse ideas, perspectives, and interests are addressed. Similarly, even as they work with governments, funding and technical assistance agencies must also assume responsibility for creating space for and listening to multiple voices.

These observations suggest that as we wrestle with notions of country led development, we must recognize that (a) aid dependence and country led development are incompatible and (b) as long as the heavy reliance on foreign aid continues, making aid more effective requires working on transparency and clarity about roles rather than assuming that external agencies (in the current parlance, “development partners”) have no interests or can ignore them or that they will subordinate their own sense of what must be done to decisions of national education officials.

APPROACHES AND TOOLS EMBEDDED IN EXTERNAL SUPPORT

External support to education in Africa carries more and less visible direct and indirect conditions. It carries as well values, assumptions, and understandings. Education aid also brings with it broad approaches and toolkits for encouraging and managing education and development. Three sets of approaches warrant special attention here.⁶

The first emerges with the widening influence of human capital theory. Education ought to be regarded as an investment in developing a country's human resources. In the World Bank’s 1995 education policy review the endorsement is unqualified: “Human capital theory has no genuine rival of equal breadth and rigor.”⁷ An extended discussion of the role of human capital theory is beyond the scope of this paper. Its importance here is the ways, often barely noticed and generally rarely challenged, in which its perspective shapes understandings of education reform. Conceiving of education as investment leads us to consider choices among education policies and allocations as alternative investment possibilities whose relative importance (value) can be assessed in terms of their projected return. Within this framework, the primary mechanism for choosing among alternative investment patterns is rate of return analysis. The tools of investment banking thus become the appropriate techniques for evaluating and assessing education policies and practices. Not learning. Not empowerment. Not reducing inequality. Not other key education objectives. And not education as an interactive process that is continually negotiated and always contextually specific.

A second approach common in the aid relationship understands education as production. Rather than the tools of investment banking, this approach brings with it the logic of

6. I draw here on Joel Samoff, “Institutionalizing International Influence,” in Robert F. Arnove and Carlos Alberto Torres, editors, *Comparative Education: The Dialectic of the Global and the Local* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, Second Edition, 2003), pp. 52-91.

7. World Bank, *Priorities and Strategies for Education: A World Bank Review* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995), p. 21.

manufacturing and especially a focus on efficiency. Recall the comments above on wastage, one of the prime measures of what this approach terms “internal efficiency.” Here, too, the adoption of the perspective and its tools is often unnoticed and only rarely addressed critically. Who could object to efforts to become more efficient? But what exactly is efficiency in education? In manufacturing, efficiency seems clear. To produce bottles or cars efficiently, for example, requires finding the lowest-cost raw materials, reducing waste and breakage, training workers to do their jobs quickly and accurately, installing machinery that is reliable, securing low cost energy, keeping maintenance simple, and making sure that expenditures on marketing are exceeded by income from increased sales. That is, efficiency in manufacturing has to do with reducing the costs of production. Though the production metaphor is occasionally useful, education is fundamentally different from manufacturing. In an interactive process, the distinction between inputs and outputs is consciously blurred. Bottles do not contribute to their own manufacture. Students do contribute to their own education. Cars do not suggest improvements in the assembly process or reject the old way of doing things. Learners are active participants in their education, not only suggesting improvements and rejecting received wisdom but taking the initiative to chart new paths. On the face of it, ever larger classes would increase an education system's efficiency. When the teacher's salary is spread across more and more students, the unit cost goes down. But of course the appropriate unit of education is not the student but learning. What matters most in an education system is not how many students there are per teacher or even how many teacher hours are allocated to each student, but rather how much and how well those students have learned. Beyond those problems, it is far from clear that efficiency, however defined, is or ought to be the primary goal to be maximized. Like those responsible for space travel, educators in poor countries may assign higher priority to redundancy.

More generally, this approach converts matters of education policy (for example, under what circumstances is repetition pedagogically, socially, politically, even economically desirable) into technical, administrative, or managerial concerns. As well, it focuses policy attention in the wrong direction. Concern with reducing the unit cost per student is likely to be far less fruitful than focusing on increasing the effectiveness of each unit of expenditure.

A corollary to stress on efficiency is insistence on feasibility and practicality. That orientation may seem quite reasonable, but in practice it constrains both education and development. Innovations are inherently risky. Since innovations are risky, funding and technical assistance agencies generally require using older, ostensibly proven and reliable approaches. A major consequence of that orientation, to return to the production metaphor, is that creative departures and the production of new means of production take place in the affluent countries. Those who are poor scramble to catch up as they watch those who are more affluent discard the approaches and technologies they are told to use. In practice, poverty is deemed to preclude fundamental innovation, which in turn is likely to perpetuate the poverty.

A third approach is reflected in the characterization of education as a delivery system. Embedded in that perspective is what Paulo Freire has termed the banking model of education. Learners are like empty bank accounts. More or less formally, teachers and others with the relevant capital, wisdom, make deposits into those accounts. Successful students save their resources and complete their education with heads full of knowledge on which they can subsequently draw. At least for younger learners, learning is understood largely as a passive process. Teachers give or provide or offer, and students receive. Where students play a somewhat more active role, they acquire knowledge and skills. Educators who understand learning as an active process, who situate learners at the center of that process, and for whom learning involves

the appropriation, manipulation, and integration of information have little voice in the policies and programs developed using an approach that understands education as a delivery system.

The terminology used is both instructive and formative. In the documents of the funding and technical assistance agencies education reforms are regularly termed interventions, that is, insertions from outside rather than initiatives from within. Externally funded, externally guided, and often externally managed, specific reform projects are rarely directly responsible to the settings—whether teachers, students, or the local community—in which they function. How are Third World educators to become owners of those reforms when they are the objects of the surgery, not the surgeons? Education is termed a delivery system, not an organic process in which learners are the doers rather than the receivers. How do recipients become owners? In practice, this combination of a vantage point external to education (whether national or foreign) and very limited accountability generally proves fundamentally disempowering.

PATHWAYS OF INFLUENCE

My concern here is the aid process and the aid relationship. My general argument is that if the effectiveness of external support is largely a function of the aid relationship, then increasing that effectiveness requires addressing that relationship directly and critically. That in turn requires getting inside the commonly used words and approaches to explore the structured patterns that they institutionalize and internalize. There have been important changes in the terminology and forms of foreign aid. The aid relationship itself seems to have changed far less than is often claimed and than is immediately apparent.

I turn now to research on an especially powerful and influential provider of external support, the World Bank. I do so not to suggest that the World Bank is either the sole or always the most important aid organization or that other organizations always and everywhere follow the World Bank's lead. That is certainly not the case, though several recent comprehensive evaluations have emphasized the centrality of the World Bank's role and the apparently declining role of the United Nations system's education organization, UNESCO. The adoption of sectoral approaches has apparently increased cooperation among other agencies, sometimes including shared representation. Yet we find very few situations where that cooperation has directly reversed the agenda articulated by the World Bank or reduced World Bank influence. A few agencies have energetically sought to strengthen partnership and reduce external direction—the Nordic and Dutch agencies stand out—but they too have generally been enmeshed in a structured aid relationship that permits only limited local direction and ownership. Not infrequently even those agencies have preferred to acquiesce in World Bank leadership rather than challenge it. Over several decades of external support there have been some aid agencies and projects with radically different conceptions of roles and responsibilities. Most often, however, they have been exceptions to common practice, swamped by the powerful tide of the aid process. Hence, it is important to focus on the World Bank, remaining attentive to the circumstances in which other agencies follow or depart from its lead.

Within the World Bank debate is often intense, sometimes acrid. Accordingly, in this attention to the World Bank and its policies and practices, it is essential to recognize the critical voices, critiques, and innovative departures that emerge within the institution. The story here is not about heroes and villains but about structured relationships.

For the present, the World Bank has asserted and assumed a central and often dominating role in education and development in Africa. Accordingly, it is useful for our concern

here with the aid relationship to explore exactly how that role works. How does an external organization so profoundly influence education policies and programmes in Africa, even where its funding—in practice, since the World Bank lends, not its funding but the resources of recipient countries themselves—is a very small part of total spending on education? To address that let us consider the multiple pathways of the World Bank's influence in higher education in Africa.⁸

Notwithstanding the important transitions in the World Bank's orientation toward education, there have been significant continuities in its education policy, including increased student fees, privatization, reduced public support for non-academic activities, and a generally diminished government role. How has it sought to make that agenda the agenda for the development of education in Africa?

In the 1960s the World Bank insisted on the importance of post-primary education. For many countries, the influence was quite direct. Years later the World Bank has changed its mind and methodology and assigned highest priority to basic education.⁹ So too did many countries in Africa, indeed around the world. Causality? In part, surely. But not everywhere, and often not direct. Tanzania provides a useful example. It was Julius Nyerere and TANU, not the World Bank, that rejected the manpower planning orthodoxy in favor of basic education. In that setting, and in others influenced by Nyerere's notion of education for self-reliance, the World Bank followed, not led. Only occasionally is a simple linear causality between World Bank pronouncement and African practice tenable. More common is what has been termed a funnel of causation in which major and minor influences that tend in the same direction become mutually reinforcing and ultimately lead to a common outcome. That funnel helps to focus attention beyond the fact and extent of influence to its process.

Viewed closely, World Bank policies emerge from a tangled mix of ideas, experiences, research, powerful individuals, and shifting alliances. Similarly, viewed closely World Bank education lending and conditionalities are buffeted and shaped by political currents inside and outside the institution. Every project, every loan, every interaction is a local tale with infinite details, all seemingly significant. Yet there are broad patterns, and they do matter. The funnel metaphor helps to clarify how diverse actions and divergent perspectives are organized into a common policy direction. At the wide end of the funnel are the debates, discussions, coalitions, and power brokers. Educators, politicians, evaluators, researchers, specialists of all sorts, community organizations, students, parents, and others may all be active. As the funnel narrows, the specific setting shapes the interactions. In different settings arguments and negotiations about, say, the priority assigned to teacher education or the role of decentralized management, may take different forms and reach different conclusions. Outcomes are in that sense conjunctural. But they occur within the confines of the funnel itself, which represents the values, assumptions, and understandings of the World Bank's global role and the world's political economy. Diverging currents, churning confrontations, and local particularities manifest a striking commonality. What flows through the narrow end of the funnel is surprisingly homogeneous.

8. The following discussion is drawn from a study commissioned by the UNESCO Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge: Joel Samoff and Bidemi Carrol, *From Manpower Planning to the Knowledge Era: World Bank Policies on Higher Education in Africa* (Paris: UNESCO Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge, 2004).

9. Note that there is strong evidence of renewed interest in secondary education. That reflects both a more holistic approach to the education sector and more focused attention on the increased demand for secondary education that is one of the consequences of increased primary enrollment.

How do external and internal pressures intersect? Patterns of influence have been varied and have evolved with changing global and local circumstances. Outsiders, from the World Bank to the former colonial powers and other governments, to the philanthropic foundations as well as governments, have long had a strong sense of how education in Africa should function. With a similarly strong sense of how instruction and research should be organized in African universities, they have regularly sought to shape departments, faculties, and institutes according to their vision. Simultaneously there have been local visions and initiatives. The two spheres overlap. Educated and socialized overseas, African decision makers, educators, and academic staff brought home not only new skills and understandings but also strong views on the appropriate mission (intellectual and developmental), domain (academic and political), and methodology (instruction and research) for higher education in Africa. With a few exceptions, local circumstances and external funding agencies have been inhospitable to the most radical higher education voices. Foreign aid in general and institutional cooperation in particular have tended to reinforce particular perspectives and orientations and thereby strengthen their advocates and to disparage and devalue others. It is not the case that all external influence is problematic or that external ideas and preferences are invariably implemented faithfully and uncritically. African universities have innovated and insisted on their own direction, and overseas institutions acknowledge learning from Africa. It does seem clear that from their creation modern higher education institutions in Africa have been strongly influenced, both directly and indirectly, by intellectual and political currents from abroad and that their organization and orientation reflect the internalization and local articulation of particular ideas about what should be their mission and focus. It also seems clear that there is little evidence of Mazrui's notion of counter-penetration—powerful African influences in the overseas institutions that educate and employ Africans or in the funding agencies for which they consult.¹⁰

Direct Advice and Conditions

World Bank influence can be explicit and direct, both in advice and in recommendations and embedded in the conditions required for the provision of funds. While the World Bank has always provided advice with its funding, in recent years it has insisted ever more forcefully that its development expertise is even more important than its loans. In large and small ways, the World Bank instructs loan recipients on what they should and should not do, when, and how. Those instructions may come from the World Bank's president or other senior officials, from mid-level managers, and from young staff who have barely completed their own education. The resources associated with those instructions make them loud and forceful, however they are articulated. That the World Bank increasingly acts as the lead funding agency or on behalf of other funding agencies makes its messages even more compelling. That the World Bank is a primary designer of aid forms and modalities enables it to set the rules that govern the aid process more generally. In this way, even as it insists that it is not imposing its will, the World Bank seeks to achieve its objectives by specifying those rules in ways that require some behaviors and preclude others.

The World Bank also exercises influence through its extensive reports and publications. Loans are enmeshed in a web of reports, from early studies to pre-appraisals to sector analyses to public expenditure reviews to implementation and management reports to narrower and broader evaluations and more. Embedded in nearly all of those reports (there are occasional exceptions) is the World Bank agenda of the moment. While their specific purposes and focuses vary, those

10. Ali A. Mazrui, "The African University As a Multinational Corporation: Problems of Penetration and Dependency," *Harvard Educational Review* 45, (1975)..

reports specify what is to be done, what has been done, and what is yet to be done. African countries and education ministries put their loan eligibility at risk when they ignore or reject the findings and recommendations of those reports.

Historically, those authors of many of those reports have been non-Africans deemed to have relevant expertise. Increasingly, in part in response to persistent critiques on this score, the World Bank has involved African researchers and evaluators in its analytic efforts. Recognizing this transition helps us understand that the nationality of the report author is far less consequential than the origins of the approaches and methodologies employed. African economists of education who employ rate of return analysis uncritically reach the same conclusions and make the same recommendations as their non-African counterparts. Rate of return analysis, however, was developed in particular settings outside of Africa and may or may not yield the same insights or have the same utility in African settings. More important, rate of return analysis may be an inappropriate tool for assessing the relative value of alternative decisions about priorities and the use of resources in education. In this example, the World Bank's influence is incorporated in analytic tools and does not depend on the nationality of those who use the tools. Indeed, the tool and the consequences of its use gain credibility and legitimacy when they are cloaked in African cloth.

Beyond its loan-related reports and associated studies, the World Bank's massive publications program directly enhances its influence. Its documents are of all sorts, from small reports on individual projects to major studies of sectors and countries to analyses of aid and its consequences to periodic reports on the state of the world. Formerly, many of the World Bank's documents remained confidential, available only to its staff and a small circle of others. More recently, more of its publications are broadly circulated, many now instantly accessible on its massive web site. Effectively, the World Bank has become a global point of reference for the major issues in which it is involved. Even resource-starved African university libraries and bare shelf bookshops may have an ample supply of World Bank publications. Most recently the World Bank has organized and managed online discussions studies and policy papers in preparation. The World Bank's annual *World Development Report* has become a standard reference for nearly everyone, including many of those who decry the assumptions, values, and orientation written into it. World Bank studies, analyses, reviews, and policy guides address all major development domains. They too are widely regarded as reliable points of reference, even though it is often difficult to cross-check their findings. Generally readable and well presented, World Bank major publications frequently do not cite their sources or rely nearly entirely on research undertaken or commissioned by the World Bank itself. Colorful boxed inserts provide vignettes and examples that should be treated as illustrative but that are commonly regarded as demonstrative or confirming. Far too often what emerges are assertions presented as facts that are accepted as facts largely because the World Bank says they are facts.

Like many dimensions of the World Bank, this information and publishing role has a dual edge. On the one hand, it is desirable that World Bank analyses, policies, and recommendations be widely available. It is especially helpful to be able to trace thinking from initial drafts and preliminary papers to final documents. On the other hand, the very profusion of documents and their authoritative character makes the World Bank the center and focus of discussion and often the term-setter, manager, and arbiter of the discussion itself. The World Bank is not, however, a neutral discussion organizer but rather an institution with a strong agenda. Notwithstanding the plethora of publications, those mixed roles do not assure transparency or accountability or even equitable access to a debate in which the issues are fully aired and critics have effective time at the microphone.

As well, the World Bank exercises direct influence through its certifying role. How are aid providers to determine whether or not a country is making progress along an agreed trajectory or implementing the activities for which it has received foreign support or fulfilling its commitments to modify spending patterns or decentralize authority or democratize political competition? Often, other funding agencies tie their own support to the satisfaction of expectations and conditions set by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Consequently, where the World Bank or the IMF has not certified that actions are appropriate or that progress is adequate, all aid stops. Even countries that prefer to seek assistance from other sources—for example, Tanzania in the late 1970s and early 1980s—find all funds blocked until they have satisfied World Bank and IMF terms.

Conditionalities, too, must be understood as a mode of direct influence. In their initial form, conditionalities had to do with increasing the likelihood of loan repayment, which in turn required increasing the likelihood of success in the activities financed by the loan. More recently, conditionalities have become a major component of policy-based lending. If the goal is to encourage particular behaviors, then attaching conditions to loans is a major way to achieve that. Structural and sectoral adjustment loans carry explicit requirements, both at the macroeconomic level and within the education sector.

The World Bank and other funding agencies stoutly defend the conditions they impose, not only in terms of the requisites of development but also to achieve desired social goals. We see here a manifestation of the expanding role of the World Bank. Initially, imposed conditions were intended to assure loan repayment and defended in those terms. Over time, providing development advice became both a purpose and a rationale for direct influence and explicit conditions. Girls' education is a clear example. For many years girls education was a barely visible or a low priority objective in African education strategies and plans. By the 1990s no policy paper, proposal, or project could ignore it. The World Bank and others simply insisted. Even more, they presented themselves as more active and more effective defenders of the disadvantaged than Africa's governments and organizations. "How do you get girls educated in the Sahel, except through conditionality?" the World Bank Vice President for Africa asked.¹¹

Note here the delicate dance the World Bank must perform as it sets loan conditions. Note too the tacit negotiations about conditions between the World Bank and recipient governments. Formally, the World Bank must lend to and negotiate with governments. At the same time, the World Bank believes that it knows better than those governments what their countries need and that it is more effective than those governments in advancing the interests of the poor, women, ethnic minorities, and other disadvantaged groups. From that perspective, it is reasonable for the World Bank to impose conditions with which government must comply. Yet those very governments must agree to the conditions. Hence the fan dance with obscuring veils and feathers. Even as it insists they change their behavior, the World Bank insists that its conditions reflect African government preferences and decisions. Sometimes, though probably less often than the World Bank claims, the governments themselves find the conditions reasonable but unpalatable to strong local political interests. From that perspective, too, it is reasonable for the World Bank to impose conditions, since it is helping the government to do what it thinks must be done but for which it cannot appear to be taking the initiative. The

11. Joel Samoff, 'How do you get girls educated in the Sahel, except through conditionality?' *External Agencies and Education in Africa* (Boston: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society, March 1995).

government can blame the World Bank for unpopular action and claim credit for beneficial results.

Powerful and influential, the World Bank is not omnipotent. African governments ignore or reject World Bank instructions at the risk of reduced funding, not only from the World Bank but from other agencies as well. Yet, African governments can create maneuvering room and can decide not to implement World Bank instructions without necessarily becoming ineligible for future funding. To understand the influence of the World Bank, and of other funding and technical assistance agencies, we must explore how that influence is mediated and negotiated.

Indirect Conditions

While they may be intrusive and onerous, direct conditions are visible. Where funding is conditional on, say, the commitment of a specified percentage of education spending to basic education, or on the privatization of textbook production and distribution, all involved can see and address whatever is expected. The conditions may be regarded as unpleasant and unreasonable, but they are apparent and can be confronted directly.

Far less visible and therefore often far more insidious and powerful are indirect conditions that may be imposed and monitored in several ways. Among them are the conditions embedded in the administration and management of the aid relationship. The expanded terrain of the analysis and planning required to support a funding request provides a clear example. For many years the World Bank has required what it terms education sector work as part of the preparation for a project proposal or loan application. The concept is straightforward. To assess the proposal for a specific activity, whether physical facilities or the learning process, as the lender the World Bank wants to be sure that what is proposed has a reasonable prospect of achieving its objectives and thus contributing to the income generation necessary to repay the loan. Education sector studies, historically undertaken by expatriate-led teams with brief, intense field work, addressed those and related issues, intended both to provide the foundation for the loan proposal and to strengthen its preparation.¹²

As critics pointed to the external orientation of those studies, to their reliance on expatriate researchers, and to their distance from national education planning and management, the World Bank and other funding agencies increasingly employed African researchers and presented results in government-led forums. At the same time, however, a different set of pressures both entrenched the external orientation of education sector studies and made them more onerous for African governments.

First, the World Bank and other funding agencies began to shift their focus away from discrete projects and toward sector-wide support.¹³ That necessarily broadened the scope and

12. For a critical review of education sector studies in Africa in the early 1990s, see Joel Samoff, with N'Dri Thérèse Assié-Lumumba, *Analyses, Agendas, and Priorities for Education in Africa: A Review of Externally Initiated, Commissioned and Supported Studies of Education in Africa, 1990-1994* (Paris: UNESCO, for the ADEA Working Group on Education Sector Analysis, 1996), and Joel Samoff, "Education Sector Analysis in Africa: Limited National Control and Even Less National Ownership," *International Journal of Educational Development* 19, no. 4-5 (July 1999-September 1999): 249-272.

13. The literature on this claimed transition is expanding rapidly. For a start, see Lene Buchert, "Towards new partnerships in sector-wide approaches: comparative experiences from Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mozambique," *International Journal of Educational Development* 22, no. 1 (2002): 69-84 and Samoff, "From Funding Projects to Supporting Sectors?" and their references. That transition may be less dramatic and less

often intrusiveness of their preparatory studies. Second, the World Bank's overarching attention to poverty leads it to insist that education be understood as part of a broader anti-poverty strategy. The required studies and other preparatory documents must therefore address not only the education sector but the entire national development strategy. Ironically, the critique that the education sector work required by the World Bank was not well integrated into national education planning and management has fostered the expectation that in order to receive funding the countries must themselves produce studies and plans in a form and manner acceptable to the World Bank. Currently, the most visible and the most imposing of those documents are the Comprehensive Development Framework and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). PRSPs have been adopted by the World Bank and the IMF, and with their leadership by other funding and technical assistance agencies) as the major framework for development cooperation.

... Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) will be broadly endorsed by the [World] Bank and [International Monetary] Fund Boards as the basis of concessional assistance from the two institutions.¹⁴

The World Bank has enormous influence over the shape and pace of Indonesia's policies and reform in its own right, but also through its production of the economic analysis that serves as the information base on which other creditors and donors rely to make decisions.¹⁵

If the PRS process were a government-led process, why would the Bank and Fund send numerous missions to the country to develop the PRS? Why would the Bank develop a 1,000 page Sourcebook to tell developing country groups how to create a PRS?¹⁶

Effectively, the approach and major tenets of structural and sectoral adjustment—a broad development agenda commonly characterized as neo-liberal and as the Washington consensus—have now had their lives extended in the form of PRSP development and approval. Note that

thorough than is often claimed. A recently completed evaluation confirms both increased sector-wide support and at the same time the persistence and utility of the project orientation: *Local Solutions to Global Challenges: Toward Effective Partnership in Basic Education. Final Report.*

14. www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/sourcons.htm [2003.10.08]

15. Alex Wilks and Fabien Lefrançois, *Blinding With Science or Encouraging Debate? How World Bank Analysis Determines PRSP Policies* (London: Bretton Woods Project, 2002). [www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/adjustment/blinding/blindful.pdf [2002.09.21]], p. 11, quoting International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development, "Comprehensive Strategies Needed for Indonesia's Recovery" (June 2002) [www.infid.be/lobby2002.html]. Though the country discussed is Indonesia, the comment is equally relevant for Africa, where few countries have Indonesia's size or presence in the global economy.

16. Wilks and Lefrançois, *Blinding With Science or Encouraging Debate? How World Bank Analysis Determines PRSP Policies*, p. 11, quoting C. Abugre, *Still Sapping the Poor? A Critique of IMF Poverty Reduction Strategies* (London: World Development Movement and ISODEC, 2001) (www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/Debt/sappoor.pdf [2003.06.06]), whose paper reports on PRSP preparation in Kenya and Ghana. The World Bank's PRSP source book is available at www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/sourcons.htm. As well, the World Bank has a PRSP web page, www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/index.htm, and a PRSP Document Library, poverty.worldbank.org/prsp/. For the World Bank/IMF review of the PRSP process, see International Development Association and International Monetary Fund *Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Early Experience With Interim PRSPs and Full PRSPs* (Washington: World Bank and IMF, 2002). Wilks and Lefrançois, *Blinding With Science or Encouraging Debate? How World Bank Analysis Determines PRSP Policies* list the analytic reports prepared for each country and sector considered for World Bank funding, p. 13.

PRSPs provide a rationale for broadened external intervention. Poverty reduction is a widely shared goal. The process of developing a national poverty reduction strategy can permit greater transparency and wider participation in debating national policies. In practice, however, that process can also broaden, extend, and legitimize external influence and can deflect and defuse the critiques of community groups even as it positions them as co-sponsors of its outcomes. Many more people can board the aid train. They can speak forcefully and loudly about where it should go. They may even sit in the driver's seat. They may determine its speed and fuel economy. The national government and community organizations are responsible for what happens. But they are proceeding along tracks whose directions and technical specifications have been set elsewhere.

Ostensibly the products of national deliberations and analysis, the CDF, PRSP, and related documents are heavily shaped by the explicit and implicit expectations of the external agencies and by national interpretations of those expectations. That extends not only to the content of the planning and analytic documents but also, and more important, to their assumptions, constructs, and tools. For example, to accept uncritically that rate of return analysis is the preferred tool for setting education priorities, or that student attrition should be addressed in terms of the efficiency of schooling, or that attention to the gendered character of power and authority in society is inappropriate in an education planning document is to exclude from discussion without debate vital issues of education policy. A political perspective that is embedded in the selection of analytic tools and the organization of research and planning documents thereby becomes a condition of receiving funding. Internalized, institutionalized, and often not fully recognized, that condition is all the more powerful for its near invisibility.

PRSPs from wildly divergent countries reveal great universality in vocabulary, process, form, content and even prescription. With some exceptions, PRSPs provide a good deal of evidence of the macro still driving the national, the global the local, the rational the practical, the technical driving the political and economic.¹⁷

The point here is not that it is undesirable to base decisions on extensive data collection and careful analysis. Of course not. Well grounded decisions are certainly to be preferred. Rather, what is important here is that the extent, form, and frequency of required education sector work overwhelm African capacities and come to rely on external staff, and that when they are

17. Wilks and Lefrançois, *Blinding With Science or Encouraging Debate? How World Bank Analysis Determines PRSP Policies*, p. 21, quoting David Craig and Doug Porter, *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: a New Convergence. What does it miss, and what can be done about it?* (Hanoi: Background paper for regional Conference on National Poverty Reduction Strategies, Organised by World Bank, UNDP, IMF and ADB, Hanoi, Vietnam, 4–6 December 2001, 2001) (www.adb.org/Poverty/PRS_Paper_30_Nov.pdf), p. 26. Other recent analyses of the PRSP process and its consequences include: Alastair Fraser, *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Now who calls the shots?* (Birmingham: Paper presented at the Review of African Political Economy Annual Conference, 2003); Jeremy Gould, Julia Ojanen, and Rosemary McGee 'Merging in the Circle': *The Politics of Tanzania's Poverty Reduction Strategy* (Helsinki: Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, 2003); Eric Hanley, "thinking and doing things about poverty II: the poverty reduction strategy process in Africa," *Progress in Development Studies* 2, no. 1 (2002): 47-51; Ravi Kanbur and David Vines, "The World Bank and poverty reduction: Past, present and future," *The World Bank: Structure and Problems*, editors, Christopher L. Gilbert and David Vines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 87-107; Rosemary McGee, with Josh Levene and Alexandra Hughes, *Assessing Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A Desk-Based Synthesis of Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Brighton, Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 2002); Judith Randel, Tony German, and Deborah Ewing *The Reality of Aid 2000: An Independent Review of Poverty Reduction and Development Assistance* (London: Earthscan Publications, 2000).

embedded in education sector work, assumptions, preferences, and conditions are both difficult to discern and sharply constraining.

Influence on Other Funding and Technical Assistance Agencies

A third pathway of World Bank influence is through other funding and technical assistance agencies. The international and national providers of financial and technical support are numerous and diverse. Each defines its own role and agenda. Each is responsible to its own governing body or national government. None can keep up with the World Bank. That was not always the case. Earlier, the World Bank credited UNESCO for the recognition of the importance of basic education. Now, the World Bank has explicitly and implicitly assumed some of the roles of UNESCO and other agencies. Across Africa the World Bank's professional capacity exceeds that of most other agencies, though the situation varies from country to country. Even though in a particular country it may not be the largest aid provider, the World Bank's macroeconomic leverage is unparalleled. It sets the pace and largely controls the form for education sector work. Not infrequently it oversees the provision and use of other agencies' funds. Its energetic development of CDE, PRSP, and related holistic strategies effectively make the World Bank the primary point of reference for how to organize and manage development assistance.

Recent years have seen increased efforts to coordinate foreign aid. In many African countries a committee or working group of funding and technical assistance agencies meets periodically to share information, address divergent expectations and practices, and speak with a single voice to the national government. Commonly, the World Bank's own voice carries great weight in those settings. Its message shapes or becomes the common message. That is especially so for higher education, since most other agencies, in part following the World Bank's lead, have shifted their attention to basic education.

Periodically the World Bank has created new organizations to strengthen this pathway of influence. A clear example is the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA), originally Donors to African Education (DAE). Initiated and centered at the World Bank, which provided its rationale, organizational priorities and structure, and secretariat, DAE brought together funding and technical assistance agencies involved in education in Africa. To increase its influence and effectiveness and assure its legitimacy required the involvement of Africa's education ministers. That has taken a momentum of its own. Over time, the organization has strengthened the ministers' roles and African participation in working group activities, relocated its secretariat to the International Institute of Educational Planning (UNESCO) in Paris, and changed its name to ADEA.¹⁸

ADEA is also a useful example for understanding the complexities of influence. While its origins are clear, currently ADEA is not solely or perhaps even primarily a vehicle for promoting World Bank ideas. Its working groups maintain a good deal of autonomy, often reflecting the interests and expectations of their own lead agencies and other participants and periodically spawning or supporting still other organizations with their own agendas (for example, the Forum for African Women Educationalists). Its biennial meetings permit active, sometimes acerbic, exchange between agencies and governments in a relatively informal setting. The African education ministers use ADEA to forge their own common messages and deliver them to funding and technical assistance agencies. At the same time, having moved beyond its origins and having

18. See www.adeanet.org.

acquired greater legitimacy as it did so, ADEA remains an important vehicle for transmitting and reinforcing ideas and practices with roots in Washington.

ADEA may also have played an unintended role within the World Bank. Precisely at the moment when its basic education message was the most forceful, the World Bank assumed formal leadership of ADEA's (then DAE's) Working Group on Higher Education (WGHE), with funding from the Ford Foundations. In practice, that increased the visibility for higher education in Africa inside the World Bank. As WGHE focused heavily on commissioning research and publications on higher education in Africa (more than 25 to date), it spoke a language well understood and difficult to ignore within the World Bank. Here, too, there is no linear causality. But it seems reasonable to infer that WGHE, the child of a World Bank effort to influence others, has contributed to the continuity of attention and lending to African higher education in a context of unsupportive institutional policy and in the face of strong objections.

New Participants in the Education Policy Process

Aid dependence has fostered another pathway of influence. Africa has seen a wide range of strategies for generating, debating, and adopting national education goals and programs.¹⁹ In many settings presidential initiatives, national commissions, États-Généraux, stakeholder forums, and other approaches have fostered vigorous debate about directions, priorities, and practices.

Education policy is perhaps always a muddy morass of conflicting interests and alternative orientations. The process matters. Who has participated? Which ideas have been considered and which discarded without examination? Whose interests are reflected? Aid dependence has brought two new participants to the African education policy table.

The external agencies, and the World Bank in particular, have become direct participants in national policy making. Although it is careful to defer formally to the national government, in practice the World Bank regularly makes clear what it regards as good and bad education policy and equally regularly makes clear that the adoption of what it regards as poor policies will limit the availability of funds. It is of course not unreasonable for the World Bank to make decisions about what it will or will not support and to communicate its preferences to African governments. What has changed, however, is that aid dependence has effectively made the World Bank an insider in those discussions. In part that participation in policy debates is formal and direct. In part, the World Bank sows the seeds through its contacts with and support for key individuals or by funding the preparation of policy briefs. As those seeds germinate, they take on national colors.

Like most external support, World Bank loans are to governments, not directly to education institutions or the education sector. As such, they are commonly administered by the finance ministry, which thereby also secures a seat at the policy table. Along this pathway, the World Bank's messages are presented in education policy debates by the national finance ministry.

19. Instructive are the cases studies of education policy making reported in David R. Evans *Education Policy Formation in Africa: A Comparative Study of Five Countries: Technical Paper* (Washington: United States Agency for International Development, 1994), and Association for the Development of African Education *Formulating Education Policy: Lessons and Experiences From Sub-Saharan Africa. Six Case Studies and Reflections From the DAE Biennial Meetings (October 1995-Tours, France)* (Paris: Association for the Development of African Education, 1996).

Thus, as the reliance on foreign funds increases, so does the influence of both the finance ministry and the external agencies. Representing the government in negotiations with those agencies, the finance ministry tends to become much more directly involved in policy and programmatic details across all government departments. That increased role may suit well the external agencies. Especially concerned with reducing government spending, those agencies are likely to see the finance ministry as their ally, in contrast with ministries of, say, health or education, whose general mandate requires them to be more concerned with spending than with saving. The alliance between external agency and finance (and perhaps planning) ministry may be structured as a powerful lever for influencing national policy.

As this occurs, the concerns, orientations, and priorities of the funding agencies are internalized in the policy process, both in the analyses and diagnoses that become the platform for policy and in the recommendations that shape the policy itself. As the distinction between insider and outsider becomes blurred, the homogenization of perspective and the adoption of universal verities, ostensibly with sound research support, proceed apace.

The World Bank distinctly prefers a rational-technical orientation to policy making, with unambiguous policy directions, systematic planning, and orderly implementation, all supported by applied research. Education itself, however, is more process than product. A rational-technical orientation to education policy disdains interactive and participatory policy making that is necessarily clumsier, muddier, and slower. As they work in an aid-dependent setting, often without being fully aware of the transition, African educators and decision makers discard education as the vehicle for national liberation, for reducing inequality, and for constructing a new society in favor of education as upgraded facilities, more textbooks, better trained teachers, and improved test scores.

Specification of Constructs and Analytic Frameworks

External support to higher education in Africa is increasingly associated with research in several important ways. The ironies are painful. Even as African universities are less able to support sustained research programs, research on education has become one of the major forms of influence on education in Africa.²⁰ The World Bank and other funding and technical assistance agencies have become research entrepreneurs. As I have noted, education sector work—studies required as part of the project approval process and more recently for broader sectoral support—continues to be an important though less visible component of the aid relationship. Formally intended to inform and guide, education sector studies in practice often serve to justify and legitimize. Ostensibly technical and functional, they carry values, assumptions, analytic frameworks, and constructs, and are thus another pathway of influence.

The specific examples are too numerous to detail here. As I have noted, rate of return analysis is presented and employed as an ostensibly neutral technique, thereby obscuring the values and assumptions embedded in its development and use. Important issues of education policy, like the circumstances in which repetition is educationally desirable, are treated as matters of efficiency. The egalitarian objectives of residential education are obscured by narrow notions of cost and benefit. The terminology can be particularly obfuscating, as increased fees become cost recovery.

20. I draw here on Joel Samoff, *When Research Becomes Consulting* (Oxford: Oxford International Conference on Education and Development, 1999) and Samoff, "Institutionalizing International Influence."

The near invisibility of this path of influence renders it particularly powerful. The World Bank controls a desired good that is highly sought by African educators. To release funds, it commissions research. While increasingly African researchers are involved in those studies, the research bears the strong imprint of those who have commissioned it. Their assumptions, understandings, and expectations are embedded in the framing questions and the detailed terms of reference. This combination of funding and research constitutes a financial-intellectual complex that is difficult to challenge or deflect.²¹ The World Bank and to a lesser extent other funding agencies need no longer announce imperiously what is to be done. Rather, they attach their funding to strategies and programs based on research findings they regard as relevant and solid. Notwithstanding the efforts of some researchers to adopt a critical posture, the commissioned research presents a strikingly coherent and self-reinforcing picture. What might be controversial becomes unexceptional as it is incorporated into frameworks and ostensibly technical questions, with no explicit or direct link to the source of the constructs or their ideological content. Some questions simply never get asked. External support guides education policy in part by shaping the research that is policy's justification.

Influence by International Conference

By the 1970s the World Bank had already begun to argue the importance of basic education in Africa. The challenge for the World Bank's education advocates was to show that education is a productive sector—and thus an appropriate focus for lending—and not simply a service. After all, earlier the World Bank had argued that education was a luxury to be enjoyed only after expanded production generated sufficient revenue to fund it. The theoretical lever was human capital theory. Spending on education could be understood as an investment in future productive capacity, like investment in new technology and equipment. But the education sector is broad, with many claimants for resources. Rate of return analysis, it was argued, showed clearly that investments in basic education yielded better societal results.²² The World Bank has championed both the method and the message for more than two decades.

The late 1980s saw the effort to make that message a global campaign, leading to the 1990 Education for All conference, followed by a 1995 mid-term conference in Jordan, and the follow up 2000 World Education Forum in Senegal. With major international support (the World Bank was one of four sponsoring organizations), a substantial commitment from the national funding agencies, and some engagement by education non-governmental organizations, the 1990 conference and follow up activities became another important pathway of influence. Ultimately, notwithstanding what its leaders or educators might say privately, no country wanted to be the lone and lonely nay-sayer, arguing an alternative perspective or different priorities. If the major players were putting their money on basic education, those seeking funds clearly had to do likewise. Not only the broad basic education message but also interpretations and implementation were communicated and given official sanction through the conference process. Education for All was to focus on expanding access, primarily to formal schools. Though mentioned, pre-school and

21. Samoff, "Chaos and Certainty in Development".

22. It is important to note that critics of this use of rate of return analysis were inside as well as outside the World Bank. For the use of rate of return analysis to reach the opposite conclusion—in Kenya, secondary, not primary, education has the higher rate of return—see John B. Knight and Richard H. Sabot *Education, Productivity, and Inequality: The East African Natural Experiment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1990). For the more general critique, see Paul Bennell, "Rates of return to education: does the conventional pattern prevail in sub-Saharan Africa?," *World Development* 24, no. 1 (1996): 183-190.

adult education were clearly lower priorities. So too were equity and quality issues, though girls' education achieved some prominence. Critics quickly raised these and other concerns, with an even louder voice in the 2000 conference. The evidence suggests, however, that the original framework has proved quite durable, even though the funding agencies have apparently not provided the resources needed to achieve agreed goals.²³

The implementation strategies associated with these international conferences further entrenched particular understandings and approaches. For the 2000 conference, countries were required to report on their progress toward EFA goals using an outline that specified topics to be addressed and data to be included. Following that conference an even more elaborate monitoring process also specified the constructs and categories that were to be used to report on and talk about EFA.²⁴

International conferences have many purposes and forms. They may or may not have influence beyond their participants or even beyond the few days that they meet. Conferences do provide opportunities for debate and disagreement and for challenging those who organize them. Sometimes conferences take on a life and momentum of their own. What is important for this discussion is to recognize the extent to which the World Bank has used the international education conferences for developing and communicating a particular message about basic education and for pressing national governments and organizations of all sorts to modify their behavior in accord with that message. Equally important is to recognize the ways in which the major message, along with its values and assumptions, are embedded in the procedures of the conferences and their follow up. Once again the ostensibly technical is in practice strongly ideological and fiercely political.

At a smaller scale the same pattern is discernible in seminars, colloquia, and task forces. The deep agenda may be more about how to approach issues than about the issues themselves or their consequences. Participants return home with a thesaurus and a toolkit. The former influences how they understand their own education sector. For example, student attrition becomes dropout, which in turn becomes wastage, obscuring the many social, economic, educational, and other pressures that push students out of school in favor of a notion of individual failure to continue. The toolkit includes a spanner for tightening some connections and loosening others, but generally not a wire cutter or acetylene torch for severing links entirely.

Study tours can play a similar role. The World Bank identifies settings where its recommendations have been effectively implemented and then brings others to see. World Bank staff are quick to note that study tours of that sort are far more influential than even the most carefully documented study, cogently presented analysis, or coherent policy recommendations.

Recruitment of African Professionals

In this review of pathways of influence, I have been especially concerned with what is not obvious, particularly routes and vehicles that are less visible and the ways in which values and

23. *Education for All: Is the World on Track?*.

24. See the World Education Forum web site: www.unesco.org/wef/. For the detailed guidelines on the preparation of national EFA country plans of action: www.unesco.org/education/efa/country_info/country_guidelines.shtml. For the EFA observatory, which is to develop standardized indicators, see www.unesco.org/education/efa/monitoring/efa_observatory.shtml.

ideas are institutionalized and internalized. Another such pathway is through the recruitment of African professionals.

For its work in and on Africa, the World Bank has relied heavily on non-Africans, including professional staff and longer and shorter term consultants. At the same time, its multinational personnel have increasingly included Africans in senior positions. Especially as it has expanded its poverty focus and its work on education, and as it has been challenged to be less Washington-centered, the World Bank has assiduously sought to hire Africans and other Third World professionals at various levels. In itself, that is not problematic. Indeed, many see that as a positive development, with benefits for the individuals employed and the countries where they work both during and after their World Bank employment and with at least some prospect that they will have some influence inside the institution. There are individual stories that support all of those expectations. Still, another dimension of this process warrants critical attention.

The World Bank is a particularly powerful socializing institution that is generally more resilient, more persistent, and more penetrating than its individual employees. Irrespective of their politics, professionals recruited to work at the World Bank, whether as interns or temporary or permanent employees, often carry with them particular assumptions, frameworks, and expectations that are (more or less consciously) influenced by World Bank policy and that in turn influence behavior in Africa. This observation refers not to their motives or intentions or ethics, but rather to the analytic orientations—core ideas not only about what makes a good education system but even more important, how to study and assess an education system—that inform their observations, findings, and recommendations. First person accounts of World Bank employment are replete with references to how things must be stated or presented to secure approval from managers and eventually the Board of Governors. Ultimately, the World Bank remains a bank, managed largely by people with expertise and experience in economics and finance. Access to funding requires requests and rationales to be formulated according to its standards, which effectively structure the education and development discourse. Humanist notions of the intrinsic value of education and educators' support for child-centered learning are simply never as persuasive as detailed cost-benefit and rate of return analyses for securing authorization for an education sector loan. To reiterate, the point here is not the intentions or good will or morality of World Bank staff but rather the occasionally direct but often much more subtle ways in which the institution shapes their ideas and their approaches. That also occurs through advanced education programs, in which young scholars adopt ideas, perspectives, frameworks, and research methods that then shape what they do when they return home, for some including, eventually, national education policy and practice. Once again, the pathways of influence are indirect, difficult to discern, and in this case, particularly delicate to challenge.

Recruiting African professionals also brings legitimacy to the World Bank's agenda, even when their work is formulaic, unimaginative, and insubstantial. One example must suffice. In 1990 the World Bank published a series of discussion papers that sought to provide a comparative overview of education reform efforts in eastern and southern Africa. Eight case studies (Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) were complemented by a brief general overview by the series editor and a literature review.²⁵ Individually, notwithstanding the experience and competence of their authors, the eight case studies say little that is new, over

25. The series editor's overview was George Psacharopoulos *Why Educational Policies Can Fail: An Overview of Selected African Experiences: World Bank Discussion Papers* (Washington: World Bank, 1990). I draw here on Joel Samoff, "The Reconstruction of Schooling in Africa," *Comparative Education Review* 37, no. 2 (1993): 181-222.

simplify complex issues of policy and practice, confuse policy pronouncements with actual behavior, employ constructs and categories uncritically, and do not substantiate their findings.

The process of embedding influence in approach is particularly clear in these papers. All manifest the assertion of the positivist faith. Studies not principally concerned with testing hypotheses, indeed all other approaches to knowledge and understanding, are fundamentally flawed. The conjunction of funding and research becomes the vehicle for imposing orthodoxy. A particular approach to knowledge is characterized as social science itself. Detached from its context and shorn of its ideology, the scientific method is transformed into an atheoretical straight jacket. Positivist proselytizing parades as injunctions for good research. And only good research should guide the allocation of funds and the specification of activities to be supported.

For whom was this series produced? Informed readers surely found the case studies superficial. Readers with little background on African education found the jargon frustrating and confusing. Policy makers were not likely to find these papers much more useful. Other sources provided clearer concise summaries and more substantial analyses. Nearly all of the authors had published more insightful, better supported and documented, and more rigorous and stimulating analyses elsewhere. Yet, reading these papers does prove instructive. They reflect both the World Bank's willingness to accept insubstantial work from competent Third World scholars and its effort to institutionalize a particular set of understandings and constructs in research on education. While those constructs do not significantly enrich these papers, it is their uncritical acceptance that is striking. Within the accepted terminology are embedded particular conceptualizations, conceptions, orientations, prejudices, and policy preferences. That discourse-structuring terminology treats as part of the environment—what is “given” and therefore does not require explicit justification and is not subjected to critical attention—important issues that ought to be the focus of policy discussion. As well, that terminology obscures important issues and thereby far too frequently misdirects the search for understanding. The quasi-official status of these constructs in a setting where the same agency oversees both funding and research effectively diverts attention from and often precludes consideration of alternatives that warrant serious exploration, systematic elaboration, and critical evaluation.

This series of publications highlights two consequences of this pathway of influence. First, the use of the constructs, frameworks, and terminology was clearly deemed more important than the substantive content of the studies. Second, that African scholars were the messengers rendered more legitimate both the message and its originating institution.

Cross-National Achievement Assessments

Yet another pathway might be termed influence by examination. Here, we move beyond the World Bank to funding and technical assistance agencies more generally. Coincident with the funding agencies' increasing attention to quality and outcomes has been an expansion in efforts to compare learning achievement across national borders. The common strategy relies on standardized tests, more or less modified to suit local conditions, to assess competence in specific subjects among generally comparable groups of students in different countries. Results often catch public attention, appearing as newspaper headlines that proclaim the improvement or decline of education in a particular country.

Assessments of that sort may provide useful information on education approaches and strategies and their implementation in diverse settings. The challenges, however, are enormous. There are major differences in understandings of what education is to accomplish and how to

measure that. The tests used necessarily embed some of those understandings and discard others. Critics charge that the international comparative analysis is generally insensitive to the importance of local variations and their consequences, both in explaining test results and in comparing outcomes. For those who understand effective learning as interactive and therefore necessarily local, the problems of cross-national testing are structural and can never be satisfactorily resolved.

Like tests everywhere, cross-national assessments incorporate curriculum understandings and can shape teachers' behavior. Commonly, and especially when they regard themselves as under-prepared, teachers teach to the test. Indeed, some reformers use modifying national examinations to change education practice. In this role, cross-national assessments become another pathway for external influence. Although there are some African initiatives of this sort,²⁶ the principal impetus and locus of control are external to Africa. With more or less African participation, and always proclaiming the universality of their approach, outsiders specify what are reasonable learning objectives for Africa, how to measure them, how to interpret the measures, and what to do when the scores are low.

OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED AID EFFECTIVENESS: THE AID RELATIONSHIP

The modern history of African universities began with dependence, formally institutionalized in the links between European universities and subordinate institutions in Africa. External support has been significant throughout their history, combining the rhetoric of development, closing the gap, protecting national initiatives, capacity building, and empowerment with the practice of continued dependence. That dependence seemed to lessen in the energy and excitement of the immediate post-colonial era. Dynamic debates within higher education were increasingly Africa-oriented and Africa-focused and decreasingly driven by the disciplines and discourses of their overseas counterparts. Though they were listening to and watching the flow of events overseas, African academics were less often following and accommodating.

Just as economic and financial crisis threatened national development plans and constrained national courses of action, so too it reinforced external direction within higher education. As structural adjustment became the order of the day, universities too found that access to (rapidly declining) funds was dependent on reorganizing in accord with externally set priorities and agendas.

Co-existing with and periodically undermining intellectual independence, intellectual dependence is maintained in several ways. At the broadest level, the global system of academic recognition—especially, publication, invitations to professional seminars and conferences, and research grants—is controlled outside Africa. At a very deep level, external influences on the intellectual structure and priorities of African universities continue to be profound and often unrecognized: what constitutes high quality social science research? what is the appropriate balance between curative and preventive medical education? what is the recognized corpus for comparative literature or music or poetry? to what extent should legal education focus on cooperatives or conflict resolution, or the social consequences of constitutions and laws? In immediate and practical terms, external influences are once again directly visible in the increasing

26. David Naudet, "Adapting Agency Solutions to Country Problems—The Lessons of Twenty Years of Aid to the Sahel Region," *Partnerships for Capacity Building and Quality Improvements in Education*, Association for the Development of Education in Africa (Paris: ADEA, 1999), 37-42.

use of curriculum developed and packaged overseas, for which the most recent but not sole examples are web based units and modules.

Foreign aid plays an important role in maintaining that external orientation. Foreign aid is always a relationship. While that relationship is shaped by dramatic inequalities of power and influence, it can neither survive nor function without direct and active African participation. We thus find a curious dance of the mutually dependent. Funding agencies, including the World Bank, and African leaders each need the other to pursue their agenda. Where governments rely more for their programmes and tenure on external funds than on a mobilized citizenry, the funders retain the upper hand.

Recall our starting point: the effectiveness of external support is a function of the aid relationship. The disabilities of the aid relationship are deep and enduring. Consequently, improving aid effectiveness cannot be achieved by modifying forms and terminology but rather requires structural transformations.

The deep context—the national interests of both providers and recipients of foreign aid and the current configuration of the global political economy—is constraining but not fully determining. There is room to maneuver, even to make substantial changes, at all levels, from very local settings to the international arena.

Seizing the initiative requires analyses of the aid relationship that proceed well beyond what is easily visible and readily observed. With that in mind, I have sought here to outline patterns of influence whose power is at least in part a function of their invisibility and thereby to render more accessible the internalization of external influence.

My concern has not been to demonize funders or lionize recipients. As I have said, this is not a story of heroes and villains but of structured relationships and complex interactions. In developing that story we must be careful not to romanticize Africa or particular countries. In the effort to explore and create partnership and ownership, just as we subject the relationship between aid providers and aid recipients to critical scrutiny, so must we develop a critical approach to the relationships between government and the education community and between government and its citizens.

Higher education institutions in Africa and their governments energetically seek external funds. With those funds come both direct conditions and indirect influences on the evolution of higher education and on African society more broadly. Terms like “partnership” and “ownership” become standard jargon that obscures the actual locus of authority and decision making. Ironically, as Africa’s universities work to secure external support, they become responsible for the internalization of the values, assumptions, and precepts that accompany foreign aid, thereby entrenching their own and national dependence. Scrambling for those funds without a corresponding critical analysis of the funding process and well informed efforts to transform it may yield short-term benefits even as it renders longer-term changes even more difficult.

REFERENCES

- Abugre, C., Still Sapping the Poor? A Critique of IMF Poverty Reduction Strategies (London: World Development Movement and ISODEC, February 2001) (www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/Debt/sappoor.pdf [2003.06.06])
- Association for the Development of African Education. *Formulating Education Policy: Lessons and Experiences From Sub-Saharan Africa. Six Case Studies and Reflections From the DAE Biennial Meetings (October 1995-Tours, France)* (Paris: Association for the Development of African Education, 1996).
- Bennell, Paul. "Rates of Return to Education: Does the Conventional Pattern Prevail in Sub-Saharan Africa?," *World Development* 24, no. 1 (January 1996): 183-190.
- Buchert, Lene. "Towards New Partnerships in Sector-Wide Approaches: Comparative Experiences From Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mozambique," *International Journal of Educational Development* 22, no. 1 (January 2002): 69-84.
- Education for All: Is the World on Track? Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2002* (Paris: UNESCO, 2002).
- Evans, David R.. *Education Policy Formation in Africa: A Comparative Study of Five Countries: Technical Paper* (Washington: United States Agency for International Development, 1994).
- Fraser, Alastair, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Now who calls the shots? (Birmingham: Paper presented at the Review of African Political Economy Annual Conference, September 2003)
- Gilbert, C. L, and David Vines, editors. *The World Bank Structure and Policies* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- Gould, Jeremy, Julia Ojanen, and Rosemary McGee. 'Merging in the Circle': *The Politics of Tanzania's Poverty Reduction Strategy* (Helsinki: Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, 2003).
- Hanley, Eric. "Thinking and Doing Things About Poverty II: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process in Africa," *Progress in Development Studies* 2, no. 1 (January 2002): 47-51.
- International Development Association, and International Monetary Fund. *Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Early Experience With Interim PRSPs and Full PRSPs* (Washington: World Bank and IMF, 2002). [www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/review/earlyexp.pdf [2003.06.06]].
- Kanbur, Ravi and David Vines. "The World Bank and Poverty Reduction: Past, Present and Future," *The World Bank: Structure and Problems*, editors Christopher L. Gilbert and David Vines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 87-107
- Knight, John B., and Richard H. Sabot. *Education, Productivity, and Inequality: The East African Natural Experiment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1990).
- Local Solutions to Global Challenges: Toward Effective Partnership in Basic Education. Final Report.* (The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Consultative Group of Evaluation Departments, 2003).

- Mazrui, Ali A. "The African University As a Multinational Corporation: Problems of Penetration and Dependency," *Harvard Educational Review* 45, (1975).
- McGee, Rosemary, with Josh Levene, and Alexandra Hughes. *Assessing Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A Desk-Based Synthesis of Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Brighton, Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 2002). [server.ntd.co.uk/ids/bookshop/details.asp?id=677 [2003.09.19]].
- Mercer, Malcolm, Paola Gosparini, Paola Melchiori, François Orivel, Matteo Sirtori, and Tuija Steinback. *Evaluation of EC Support to the Education Sector in ACP Countries. Synthesis Report* (Brussels: Development Researchers' Network and FTP International, 2002).
- Naudet, David. "Adapting Agency Solutions to Country Problems--The Lessons of Twenty Years of Aid to the Sahel Region," *Partnerships for Capacity Building and Quality Improvements in Education*, Association for the Development of Education in Africa (Paris: ADEA, 1999), 37-42
- Psacharopoulos, George. *Why Educational Policies Can Fail: An Overview of Selected African Experiences: World Bank Discussion Papers* (Washington: World Bank, 1990).
- Randel, Judith, Tony German, and Deborah Ewing. *The Reality of Aid 2000: An Independent Review of Poverty Reduction and Development Assistance* (London: Earthscan Publications, 2000).
- Sack, Richard, Michael Cross, and Jeanne Moulton. *Evaluation of Finnish Education Sector Development Cooperation* (Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2004).
- Samoff, Joel. "Chaos and Certainty in Development," *World Development* 24, (1996): 611-633.
- Samoff, Joel. "Education Sector Analysis in Africa: Limited National Control and Even Less National Ownership," *International Journal of Educational Development* 19, no. 4-5 (July 1999-September 1999): 249-272.
- Samoff, Joel. "From Funding Projects to Supporting Sectors? Observations on the Aid Relationship in Burkina Faso," *International Journal of Educational Development* 24,4(July 2004):397-427.
- Samoff, Joel, 'How do you get girls educated in the Sahel, except through conditionality?' External Agencies and Education in Africa (Boston: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society, March 1995)
- Samoff, Joel. "Institutionalizing International Influence," in Robert F. Arnove and Carlos Alberto Torres, editors, *Comparative Education: The Dialectic of the Global and the Local* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, Second Edition, 2003), pp. 52-91.
- Samoff, Joel. "The Reconstruction of Schooling in Africa," *Comparative Education Review* 37, no. 2 (1993): 181-222.
- Samoff, Joel, When Research Becomes Consulting (Oxford: Oxford International Conference on Education and Development, September 1999)
- Samoff, Joel. "Which Priorities and Strategies for Education?," *International Journal of Educational Development* 16, no. 3 (July 1996): 249-271.

- Samoff, Joel and Bidemi Carrol. *From Manpower Planning to the Knowledge Era: World Bank Policies on Higher Education in Africa* (Paris: UNESCO Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge, 2004).
- Samoff, Joel, and Bidemi Carrol, "The Promise of Partnership and Continuities of Dependence: External Support to Higher Education in Africa," *African Studies Review* 47,1 (April 2004):67-199.
- Samoff, Joel, with N'Dri Thérèse Assié-Lumumba. *Analyses, Agendas, and Priorities for Education in Africa: A Review of Externally Initiated, Commissioned and Supported Studies of Education in Africa, 1990-1994* (Paris: UNESCO, for the ADEA Working Group on Education Sector Analysis, 1996).
- Wilks, Alex, and Fabien Lefrançois. *Blinding With Science or Encouraging Debate? How World Bank Analysis Determines PRSP Policies* (London: Bretton Woods Project, 2002).
[www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/adjustment/blinding/blindful.pdf [2002.09.21]].
- World Bank. *Priorities and Strategies for Education: A World Bank Review* (Washington: World Bank, 1995).